Demand-Driven Power Supply Chain Game Theory Security Control

Abstract

As the proportion of hydropower in electricity supply gradually increases, the stable operation of the hydropower supply chain faces the dual challenges of uncertainty in water resource storage on the power generation side and fluctuations in demand on the power consumption side. In response to the strategic interactions between hydropower companies and users in bilateral electricity transactions and the robustness requirements of the electricity supply chain system, this paper constructs a non-cooperative dynamic game framework to characterize the game strategies of hydropower dispatch and user demand. By solving the Markov Perfect Equilibrium (MPE), we reveal the dynamic strategy interaction mechanism driven by water resource energy storage status, forming a two-way feedback regulation between energy storage and demand. Based on this, we integrate robust  control concepts, treating inventory fluctuations and demand disturbances as the “worst-case scenario” in the game. Through a robust control strategy that minimizes extremes, we achieve cost optimization and stability improvement in the supply chain under uncertainty. Finally, the game equilibrium strategy is embedded into a robust control framework to form a joint optimization strategy, and the effectiveness of the proposed method is verified through numerical examples.